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Abstract 
 
This paper covers the pressing challenges of the on-site tax auditing in the Russian Federation. Although the number of the on-
site tax inspections is currently being reduced in Russia, it does not affect their performance efficiency as the tax control 
authorities select the auditees more thoroughly. We believe that it is a good practice to enhance the performance of the on-site 
inspections by addition of more criteria to the list of taxpayer selection criteria. This list of criteria may be constantly added for 
more accurate and effective selection of business units to facilitate further on-site auditing. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
So far, the key objective of all countries in the area of taxation policy is to achieve an optimal fiscal performance. The tax 
administration is aimed to ensure tax returns to the budget system in due time and to the full extent. For the funds being 
taxes and other obligatory payments to the budget to raise in full, the taxpayers should exactly comply with the tax laws 
and other regulations. This is precisely why the tax auditing performance is extensively focused now being a primary tax 
control in the system of tax administration. 
 
 Theory 2.
 
Assessment of tax authority performance primarily requires determining the definition of tax control performance. The tax 
control performance means a relationship between tax control objectives and effects. The result of inspections is 
additional tax charges, dues, fees and fines, however, the additional charges should be legally acceptable while the 
penalties should be applied correctly. 
The first thing to be done for the on-site inspections is thorough selection of the auditees using public criteria of the 
independent risk evaluation for the taxpayers, which are employed by tax authorities for such selection. The necessity to 
study these criteria is caused by using extra criteria for more accurate screening of taxpayers subjected to on-site tax 
auditing. It is obvious that not all the criteria are effective for taxpayers screening. Such criterion as recognition of 
significant tax deductions in accounts over a defined period (37%) is mostly used. Then the tax burden of the taxpayer 
(31%) follows it, which is below the mean business unit level for a particular industry. If the data of any company differ 
from industry average values, such company will enter the risk group. However, the industry average offset does not 
always mean understatement of tax base and attempts to evade the payment of taxes. The reasons of industry average 
offset may lie within the business profile and facility retrofit. Therefore, these criteria are not always indicative of the 
taxpayer’s negligence. The result is insufficiency of criteria for an effective selection of taxpayers for planning an on-site 
tax auditing campaign. The tax authorities should be assessed for their performance at the stage of on-site tax auditing in 
order to analyse the taxpayer selection procedure. 
It should be noted that the taxpayer selection procedure and the relation between the tax authorities and the 
taxpayers in general are covered by Alm J., Cherry T., Jones M., McKee M, [1], [2], Li D., He Y., Xu Y., Fan Y. [3], Rusdi 
Hidayat N., Suhadak, Darminto, Handayani S. R., Otok B. W. [4], Hauptman L., Horvat M., Korez-Vide R. [5], Tay, A.S.M. 
[6]. Crokidakis N. [7] examine the evasion of the taxes. Tan F., Yim A. [8], Hauptman L., Horvat M., Korez-Vide R. [9] 
describe the anti-evasion tools. The international fiscal cooperation is covered by Kudrle, R.T. [10], Orlova M. [11]. 
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 Results 3.
 
The performance of on-site tax auditing conducted by Russian tax authorities over a period from 2011 through 2013 is 
provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. On-site tax inspections in the Russian Federation over 2011-2013 
 
Reference 2011 2012 2013 
Total inspections in Russia 73 844 67 351 39 771 
Inspections that revealed taxation breaches 71 124 66 579 39 316 
Total additional charges due to the inspections, thousand Rubles 287 946 791 311 495 826 279 289 995 
Additional tax charges, thousand Rubles 214 927 383 236 859 119 210 624 978 
Fines, thousand Rubles 73 019 408 74 636 707 68 665 017 
Inspections of companies of total number on-site inspections 51 653 45 083 33 196 
Inspections of companies that revealed taxation breaches 51 081 44 664 32 806 
Total additional charges (company), thousand Rubles 271 302 942 300 561 500 270 014 394 
Additional tax charges (company), thousand Rubles 202 825 040 228 838 285 203 814 582 
 
As is seen in the Table 1, the number of on-site tax inspections reduces at fast paces. 40 thousand inspections were 
conducted in 2013, i.e. 54% of the on-site inspections in 2011. Therefore, the number of inspections reduced by 46% for 
the last two years. The additional tax charges increased in 2012 by 24 trillion Rubles while they amounted in 2013 at 279 
trillion Rubles, which was 9 trillion Rubles less than in 2011 and 33 trillion Rubles less than in 2013. It was fully expected 
as the number of inspections reduced by half. The percentage of additional tax charges was 75% in 2011, 76% in 2012 
and 75.5% in 2013.  
According to Table 1, the objectives were achieved in 2012. The additional tax charges come up to 74-76% of the 
on-site tax inspections, which is 10% less than of the off-site inspections. In 99% of the cases, the on-site tax inspections 
revealed breaches in each of the three years under consideration, which is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. On-site tax inspections in the Russian Federation over a period of 2011-2013  
 
In 2012, the total number of on-site tax inspections in Russia reduced by 6.5 thousand inspections versus 2011 and 
amounted 67,351 tax inspections, while their number dropped by 41% by 2013 to amount 39,771, which was 27.5 
thousand inspections less than in 2012 and 34 thousand less than in 2011. In 2013, the percentage of on-site inspections 
was 53% of those conducted in 2011 that means effective performance of the tax policy. According to 2013 data, the 
performance of tax service to screen auditees for inspections comes up to 99%.  
The bar chart (Fig. 2) shows how the on-site tax inspections performed in the Volga Federal District grew in 2013 
among the total figures.  
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Fig. 2. The number of on-site tax inspections performed in federal districts of Russia in 2013 
 
Thus, 8331 on-site tax inspections were conducted in the Volga Federal District in 2013. Thanks to this, the Volga 
Federal District occupies the second place among all federal districts of Russia. The Central Federal District heads the 
list with its 11,184 on-site inspections conducted in 2013. The Siberian Federal District comes third with 4,999 on-site 
inspections. However, if we look at the positioning of the districts in this analysis in terms of the performance of the on-
site inspections, it stands in stark contrast to their number. The North Caucasian Federal District has the lead with 99.7% 
performance of on-site inspections. Remaining in an uptrend, the Volga Federal District occupies the second position with 
99.4% performance. With its 99.3%, the Southern Federal District makes the top three. Generally, the lowest 
performance was recorded in the North-Western Federal District (97.5%) being a relatively high indicator. It means that 
the performance efficiency of the on-site tax inspections is up to par, which does not drop below 97.5%. 
Therefore, the number of on-site tax inspections is being reduced in Russia; however, it does not lower their 
performance efficiency, it rather increases, as the tax control authorities more thoroughly select the auditees for tax 
inspections. It should also be noted that the tax inspections feed the budget completely, which makes them an invaluable 
and irreplaceable budgeting tool at this stage of civilised society evolution.  
 
 Conclusions 4.
 
The enhancement of tax administration should integrate both the activities to improve tax authority performance, tax 
control modes and methods and the measures of screening the auditees for on-site tax auditing. The problem of 
sustainable selection of taxpayers for test audits is more challenging in the context of large-scale violations of tax laws 
specific to the current economic growth of Russia. The selection of taxpayers to include into the on-site tax audit schedule 
requires a reasonable approach. Therefore, the tax offices should put more emphasis on analytical monitoring of financial 
and economic relations between the related parties considering that the related groups of business units still use different 
evasion techniques including transfer prices and establishment of profit centres in the areas with lower tax level.  
With the variety of market relations, employment of dependence relations becomes one of the most comfortable 
evasion techniques that fix the deal prices other than market prices. To recognise mutual dependence of the parties, 
consideration is given to the influence, which may be exerted through participation of one party in the equity of the other 
one based on the agreement between them or if one party can differently determine the decisions taken by the other 
party. Such influence should be taken into consideration irrespective of whether one party exercises it alone or together 
with related parties. Therefore, taxpayers who are the related parties with the large-size taxpayers should be subjected to 
the tax control in connection therewith. Determination of the aforesaid parties means tax control activities towards both 
the major taxpayer and its counterparties. Both the legal system and the regulatory bodies surely have an increased 
focus on this category of taxpayers. However, the suggestion to add the undermentioned criteria to the on-site tax audit 
planning philosophy is seen as a prerequisite to more accurate selection of taxpayers for on-site tax auditing with the tax 
administration being enhanced. The following two criteria are proposed to be added:  
- Relation of this taxpayer with major taxpayers; and 
- Relation of this taxpayer with the economic entity, which revealed severe violations due to on-site tax 
inspections.  
Additional criteria will help improve the taxpayer selection system for on-site auditing the risk-related organisations 
that may breach the regulations. As the tax authorities are restricted in human and material resources, the tax inspections 
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need to be as effective as possible requiring the minimum of efforts and means for their conduction due to selection of 
such taxpayers that are likely to occur within the list of taxpayers with high capability of tax violations. Using these criteria 
for screening of taxpayers will update the list of potential auditees that satisfy more criteria. 
The economic entity related taxpayers having severe violations are subject to purpose selection, as the probability 
to reveal tax violations is high owing to relation with unfair taxpayers. Completely new selection principals should be 
implemented to enhance performance efficiency of test inspections. This will ensure automated selection of taxpayers, 
enhance the performance of the on-site tax inspections and will make it possible to get off the subjective approach to pick 
an auditee for auditing.  
Additional taxpayer selection criteria would be useful for development of software, which would pick the potential 
auditees in decreasing order of above-mentioned criteria. The list of criteria may be constantly added for more accurate 
and effective selection of business units to facilitate further on-site tax auditing. 
Perfection of these tax administration areas will improve the Russian tax system. Enhancement of tax 
administration efficiency is aimed at a balance between rights and obligations of taxpayers and tax authorities, which will 
also increase the level of a qualitative cooperation between the tax system parties and will have a positive effect on the 
growth of Russian economic system in general. 
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